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PEOl'I,E 1.'. R.IGNEY

[Crim. No. GG73.

In Bnnk.

[55 C.2d

Jan. 27, 1961.]

THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. LOUIS FREDRICK
RIGNEY, Appellant.

)

[1] Witnesses-Examination by Court.-A trial judge may examine
witnesses to elicit or c1nrify testimony.
[2] Criminal Law-Course and Conduct of Trial.-It is the right
and duty of a judge to eonduet a trial in such manner that the
truth will be established in accordance with the rules of evidence.
[3] ld.-Conduct of Judge.-The trial judge must not become an
advocate for either party or, under the guise of examining witnesse~, C01l1lllent on the evidence or cast aspersions or ridicule
on n witness.
[4] ld.-Conduct of Judge.-A judge lIIust not defeat the purpose
of Pen. Code, § 1122, and Code Civ. Proc., § 611, providing that
he must admonish the jury not to form or express any opinions
on any subject connected with the trial until the ease is finally
submitted to them, by comment on the evidence during the
trial, but must also keep an open mind until he has had an
opportunity to hear nIl the evidenee.
[5] ld.-Conduct of Judge.-Comment by the judge during the
trial should be expressly labeled as his opinion and the jury
advised that it may be disregarded; questions are 110t so labeled
and, when they convey the judge's opinion of the credibility
of a witness, there is grave danger not only that they may
induce the jury to form an opinion before the case is finally
submitted to them, but that the jury will substitute the judge's
opinion for their own.
[6] ld.-Conduct of Judge.-The judge may not ask questions to
eonvey to the jury his opinion of the credibility of a witness
or intervene so extensively in behalf of the proseeutor as to
align himself with the prosecutor in the minds of the jury.
[7] ld.-Conduct of Judge-Questioning Witnesses.-The mere
fact that the judge examined It witness at some length does
not establish misconduct.
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Witnesses, § 76; Am. Jur. , Witnesses, § 557.
[3] See Cal.Jur.2d, Trial, § 385 et seq.; Am.Jur., Trial, § 74 et
seq.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Witnesses, ~ 92; [2] Criminal Law,
~ 1075; [3-G. 10] ('I'illlino] Law. ~ 3~S; [7-9, 11, 12] Crimina]
Law. ~ 3~7; [13] Jury. Ill; [1-11 .Jury, 102(1); [15] Homicide,
~ 281(3); [16] Homicio\', \\ ::!Sl; [Ii} TIolldei<1t', § 284; [18] Homi.
cide, § 284(1); [19] Criminnl Law, § 933.
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[8] ld.-Conduct of Ju(lge-Questioning Witnesses.---Jt is offlinarily better praetire for a trial jnt1i-ie to let counsel develop
the case, and to undl'l"takc the eX:lJllination of witnesses only
when it appears that 1'C'IC'vant :llIrllllnterinl te~timony will not
be eliciti'll by eOllll~(,1.
[9] ld.-Conduct of Judge-Questioning Witnesses.-Even if testimony elicited by the judge'S questions would probably have
been elicited byeoun~el, that bet alone docs IIOt render the
judge's questions improper.
[10] ld.-Conduct of Judge.-There was nothing improper in the
judge's candidly advising counsel in chambers of his disbelief
in defendant's evidence.
[11] ld.-Conduct of Judge-Questioning Witnesses.-There was
nothing improper in the judge's questiouing witnesses to induce the jury to share the judge's di~belief in defendant's evidence if his questions were designed, as he stated in a conference with counsel in chamhers, to bring out all the facts
that bore on the suhject fnil'ly nnJ impartinllyto the end that
justice might be approximated as closely as might be by the
jury.
[12] ld.-Conduct of Judge-Questioning Witnesses.-In a prosecution for assault with a deadly weapon with intent to commit
murder, wherein defendant testified that he did .not remember
going to his room and getting his gun hefore the alleged assault, questions asked defendant by the judge were designed to distinguish clearly the facts defendant remembered
and those he did not remember and to clarify inconsistencies
between his testimony and his previous statement to his naval
superiors, and questions the judge asked a doctor connected
with a naval hospital were designed to get a full explanation
of the nature and causes of retrograde amnesia, and werc
not a guise for conveying to the jury the court's disbelief in
defendant's evidence but were asked to get the truth estahlished, fairly and impartially brought out relevant and material
testimony, and were not improper, where the judge instructed
the jury that any intimatIon in his questions or the questions
of counsel that certain facts were or were not true must be
disregarded, and that the jury were the exclusive judges of
the effect and value of the evidence.
[13] Jury-Challenges-Peremptory.-A juror may not be examined on 'Voir dire solely for the purpose of laying the foundation for a peremptory challenge.
[14] Id.-Challenges-For Cause-Voir Dire.-If special circumstances made defcndant's questions asked prospective jurors
on voir dire, apparently designed to obtain information for

[13] See Ca.l.Jur.2d, Jury, § 122 et seq.; Am.Jur., Jury, § 107.
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percmptory clJallcn;,;es, relevant to show bias or other grolllH\"
for challenge for cause, he ~hou\d have informe,l the court of
his reasons for asking the 'juestions.
[15] Homicide-Assault With Intent to Commit :rvIurder-Evidence
-Threats.-Ill a prosecution for assault wit h a deadly wen pOll
with intent to eOlllmit murder, it was not error for the eonrt to
rule out of order a question designed to estahlish thnt the vietim threatened to "tenr [defem1nnt] npnrt" where defendn!lt
did not hear the threat and where, at the tillle the question was
asked, there was no evidence that the victim Illay have been
the aggressor or that defendant was Mtlng in self-dcfensl'.
Evidence of an uncollllllunicated threat is proper only after a
foundation has been lnid tending to show that the victim W:IS
the aggressor, and the question was not rcasked after such
foundation had been laid.
[16] Id.-Assault With Intent to Commit Murder-Evidence.-In
a prosecution for assault with a deadly weapon with intent to
eOlllmit murder, there was no llU·rit to defendant's contention
that the court erred in ruling out of order a question designed
to elicit the ,'ietim's tone of ,oicc ,.. hen he stated that he was
coming out to see defendant where, after the question was
asked, the court stated that the victim's tone of voice was
irrelevant, but the answer to the question, thnt the victim's
tone was "harsh," was not struck and remained in the record
for the jury's consideration.
[17] Id.-Assault With Intent to Commit Murder-Instructions.In a prosecution for assault with a deadly weapon with intent
to murder a friend of defendant's wife after their interlocutory divorce, where there was evidence that defendant contemplated the use of force to visit his child, the court properly
instructed the jury that defendant did not have the right to
use force, and it was proper to refuse defendant's proposed
instruction that defendant had a right to visit the child, but
which failed to state that he could not use force to do so,
[18] Id.-Assault With Intent to Commit Murder-Instructions.In a prosecution for assault with a deadly weapon with intent
to commit murder, the court did not err, on the jury's request
for further instructions on intent and transfer of intent, in
repeating the instructions on transferred intent and in usingexamples in which members of the jury were parties and referring to the foreman as ")Iy friend," where the court's
earlier instructions fully and adequately instructed the jury on
the law of intent and the foreman indicated that the repeat('d
instructions answered the question asked by the jury.
[19] Criminal Law - Verdict - Recordation.-Pen. Code, § 1164,
relating to recordation of verdict and proceeding-s on disagreement of jurors, does not preclude the jury's making a separate
return of its verdict on each count when more than one count
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is chargeu. PI'n. Code, § Uj·l, expressly vests in the court the
power to hnve ;;ep:lratc (,OUllts tried sepa1'lltely, and thefe is no
reason why the COl11't should not have the jury's verdicts 011
each count returneu separately.

APPEATJ from a judgment of the Sup<'rior Conrt of San
Diego County amI from all orller denying a new trial. E<lgar
B. Hervey, Judgc. Affirll1<,d,
Prosecution for assalilt with a Il.'adly wcapon with int('llt
to eommit murder. Judgment of eonviction of assault with a
deadly weapoll, anu of as~allit with a deadly weapon with
intent to commit mUl'del', affirmell.
Newberry & Prallte and Staffoi'll \V, Praute for ApI)ellant.
Stanley Mosk, AttOl'lH'Y General, \Villiam E .•James, Assistant Attorney General, allll Philip C, Griffin, Deputy Attorney General, for Respondent.
TRAYNOR, J.-Defemlant appeals from a judgment entered· on a jury verdict convieting him of two counts of
assault with a deadly weapon and one count of assault with a
deadly weapon with intent to commit murder.
Defendant, a hospital corpsman in the United States Navy,
was married to Janet Rigney, one of the prosecuting witnesses. Janet secured au interlocutory decree of divorce in
July 1958. The decree awarded her custody of their infant
daughter and gave defendant the right of reasonable visitation. He customarily visited the child one afternoon each
weekend at a San Diego hotel where Janet '8 father resided.
On the afternoon of Saturday, October 11, 1958, defendant
arrived at the hotel to visit the child, but Janet bad failed
to bring her. After the time for the visit had elapsed, defendant drove to Janet's apartment in La Mesa, arriving there
between 4 :30 and 5. He found the front screen door locked
and remained outside. Janet and Gaither Charles Brown met
him at the door. Brown said that he had heard that defendant had been looking for him and asked if defen.iant wanted
to see him, Defendant replied, "No, I don't care what you
do; I came over to see the baby." He then asked Janet why
she had not brought their daughter to the hotel. .Janet replied
that defendant had told her the previous week that he was
not going to be in San Diego Saturday and defendant said
she knew that was not true. He then asked if he could come
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the following day. Janet said that she and Brown had olhl'l'
plans, Defendant tUl'lled to leave, aud Bt'own followed hilll
out to the gate. DefenJant testified that BI'OWll told hilll to
"ls]tayaway from Jan and 1"ynn lthe baby]. If you wallt
to see anyone, come alld sce me." Brown denied saying anything.
Defcnllaut I'ctul'1led to San Diego. There is evidence that
he had two or three mal·tillis, went to his hotel room and got
his pistol, and dl'ove back to his wife's apartment, arriving
there about 6 p.m. lIe walked to the locked ~(Jreen door and
said: "Tell Chuck [Brown] I changed my mind. I'd like
to see him outside." The prosecutioll's witness testified that
Janet called out" Rigs is back." Browll came from the bathroom, holding a glass and cat'rying his coat. He tossed the coal
to his daughter Sharon and her friend Lynette, who dropped
it, and handed the glass to Sharon, who dropped it, aud it
broke, As Brown approached the door, defendant drew hi!'!
pistol and fired two shots, Browll flattened himself against
the wall to the left of the door. Defendant fired two more
shots, wounding Janet and Sharon. Brown looked otit the
door and sa,v defendant fumbling with the pistol. Brown
jumped out, grabbed the pistol, and the two men scuffied.
They entered the apartment where the pistol again discharged,
. wounding defendant in the left arm and shoulder. Brown aud
defendant continued the struggle and rolled outside. Brown
seized the pistol aud threw it into the nearby swimming pool.
The police arrived shortly thereafter.
Defendant testified that his memory was impaired as to
all events after his return to San Diego. He remembered
drinking one single and one double martini and upon reaching
his wife's apartment the second time seeing Brown suddenly
appear at the screen door, jump to the side of the door and
reach for his hip pocket. He did not remember going to his
room and getting his gun. He did remember, however, that
he had no intent to kill anyone and that he armed himself to
prevent a fight with Brown. He testified that he remembered
only isolated events after seeing Brown reach for his hip
pocket and that he did not remember firing the gun.
Defendant contended throughout the trial that he did not
form the specific intent to commit murder. His description
of his state of mind during the period between his first departure from his wife's apartment and the moment he ceased firing
as well as the conclusions of hi!'! medical expert, Doctor Robert
F. Brandmeyer, a member of the psychiatric staff of the

J
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United States Naval Hospital in San Diego, as to his state
of mind during those critical moments were therefore vital to
his defense. He contends that the trial judge erroneously
questioned him and his medical expert ill such an extensive,
repetitious, and argumentative mauner as to indicate to the
jury the judge's disbelief that defendant could not remember
what had happened and that the judge compounded his error
by failing adequately to charge the jury that they were the
sole judges of the facts.
[1] A trial judge may examine witnesses to elicit or
clarify testimony (People v. Corrigan, 48 Ca1.2d 551, 555 [310
P.2d 953] ; People v. Ottey, 5 Ca1.2d 714, 721 [56 P.2d 193] ;
People v. Carlin, 178 Cal.App.2d 705, 714-715 [3 Cal.Rptr.
301] ; People v. Montgomery, 47 Cal.App.2d 1, 18 [117 P.2d
437]). [2] Indeed, "it is the right and duty of a judge
to conduct a trial in such a manner that the truth will be
established in accordance with the rules of evidence." (People
v. Corrigan, supra, at p. 559.) [3] The trial judge, however, must not become an advocate for either party or under
the guide of examining witnesses comment on the evidence or
cast aspersions or ridicule on a witness. (People v. Campbell,
162 Cal.App.2d 776, 787 [329 P.2d 82] ; People v. Lancellotti,
147 Cal.App.2d 723, 731 [305 P.2d 926) ; People v. Huff, 134
. Cal.App.2d 182, 187-188 [285 P.2d 17]; People v. Deacon,
117 Cal.App.2d 206, 209 [255 P.2d 98}.}
[ 4] Both Penal Code, section 1122, and Code of Civil
Procedure, section 611, provide that the judge must admonish
the jury not to form or express any opinions on any subject
connected with the trial until the case is finally submitted to
them. A judge must not defeat the purpose of these provisions by comment on the evidence during the trial but must
also keep an open mind until he has had an opportunity to
hear all the evidence. [5] Moreover, comment should be
expressly labeled as the judge's opinion, and the jury advised
that it may be disregarded; questions are not so labeled, and
when they convey the judge's opinion of the credibility of a
witness, there is grave danger not only that they may induce
the jury to form an opinion before the case is finally submitted to them, but that the jury will substitute the judge's
opinion for their own. [6] The judge, therefore, may not
ask questions to convey to the jury his opinion of the credibility of a witness. (People v. Huff,· 134 Cal.App.2d 182, 188
[285 P .2d 17).} Nor should he intervene so extensively in
behalf of the prosecutor as to align himself with the prose-
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cutor in the minds of the jury. (People v. Robinson, 179 Cal.
App.2d 624, 633-637 [4 CaLRptr. 50].)
In the present case the trial judge, over defendant's objection, examined him extensively as to events immediately preceding the shooting, interrupting the deputy district attorney's cross-examination to do so. The judge questioned defendant closely to clarify inconsistencies between his testimony on the stand and statements he had previously made.
After defendant was excused as a witness and Doctor Braudmeyer was about to take the stand, the judge recalled defendant and once again questioned him as to his memory of the
shooting. After defendant had been excused a second time
and before Doctor Brandmeyer's examination began, the
parties retired to chambers for a conference.
During the conference the judge stated that he did not
believe defendant's testimony about his lapse of memory and
that he believed that defendant went to his wife's apartment
the second time, not to discuss visitation rights, but to fight
with Brown. The court said: "He didn't think there was
going to be any discussion ..• I'm not going to swallow
that at all...• I'm not going to let the jury swallow it."
The judge, however, had stated earlier: "It seems to me rather
strange that this young man can remember up to the point
where he not only sees a man reach for his hip pocket, but
after that he reasons in his mind, 'I'm about to be killed unless
I can act,' and before he can act, he forgets everything. It
seems to me that was a very convenient time to start suffering
from amnesia. I am frank to say I don't believe it. I'm not
trying the facts in this case. The defendant under the constitution is entitled to a jury by twelve people, and they might
believe it, and if they do believe it, he is entitled to that, and
I would a whole lot rather one guilty man go free, whether he
be guilty or not, than I would rather ten guilty men go free
and one innocent man be convicted, in my book.
"Now my view is simply this, gentlemen. I will tell you
that very frankly. I don't think a courtroom is a place to play
a checker game. I don't think a courtroom is a football contest or boxing contest. I don't think the courtroom is a contest
for the purpose of seeing who is the smarter lawyer, or who
can persuade the jury best, at all. I think the courtroom is
a place to see that justice is done, and I think a courtroom is
a place to bring out all the facts that bear upon the subject,
and to bring them out fairly and impartially to the end that
justice may be approximated as closely as may be by the jury.
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That is why I asked this young man some questions to find
out just at what point he claims he startetl suffering this loss
of memory and as I havc said, in the abscncc of the jury and
on this record, I can't quite accept all of his story, but I
don't know what the jury'8 going to think about it, and I'm
not going to tell the jury what they ought to think about it.
I'm going to ask questions as I see fit, to give the jury all the
light that they can have in order that they may derive,arrive at their own opinions. . . . "
These statements were made out of the presence of the jury
and did not induce defendant to abandon any of his defenses.
Following the confercnce in chambers the judge examined
Doctor Brandmeyer at great lcngth concerning petitioner's
alleged retrograde amnesia. Defendant '8 motions for a mistrial and a new trial bascd partly on the judge's questioning
defendant and Doctor Brandmeyer were denied.
[ 7] .Although the judge questioned defendant and Doctor
Brandmeyer at great length "The mere fact that the judge
examined . . . at some length does not cstablish misconduct."
(People v. Corrigan, supra, 48 Ca1.2d 551, 559; People v.
Montgomery, supra, 47 Ca1.App.2d 1, 18.)
[ 8] It is ordinarily better practice for a trial judge to
let counsel develop the case and to nndertake the examination
of witnesses only when it appears that relevant and material
testimony will not be elicited by coullsel. (See People v.
Campbell, 162 Cal..App.2d 776, 787 [329 r.2d 82].) [9] Even
if the testimony elicited by the judge's questions, however,
would probably have been elicited by counsel, that fact alone
does not rendcr the judge's questions improper.
Defendant contends that the judge's comments in the conference in chambers disclosed his purpose to invade the province of the jury by inducing it to disbelieve defendant's evidence about his lapse of memory and that the judge accomplished that purpose by improp€'r questioning of defendant
and Doctor Brandmeyer.
[10] It is immaterial that the judge did not believe
defendant's evidence or even that his purpose was to induce
the jury not to b€'lieve it so long as he sought to accomplish
that purpose by getting the truth established according to the
governing rules of law. Certainly there is nothing improper
in the judge's candidly advising counsel in chambers of his
disbelief in defendant's evidence. [11] Nor is there anything improper in his qu€'stioning witnesses to induce the
jury to share that disbelief, if his questions are designed, as
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the judge stated in the conference in ('hambers, "to bring out
all the facts that bear upon the suuject, and to uring them out
fairly and impartially to the end that justice may be approximated as closely as lllay be by the jury."
[ 12 ] The questions the jmlge asked defendant were
designed to distinguish clearly the facts that defendant remembered and the facts that he did not remember and to
clarify the inconsistencies between his testimony and his previous statement to his naval superiors. The questions the judge
asked Doctor Brandmeyer were designed to ge.t a full explanation of the nature and causes of retrograde amnesia. A careful examination of the record convinces us that the judge's
questions were not a guise for conveying to the jury the
court's disbelief in defendant's evidence but were asked to
get the truth established, and that they fairly and impartially
brought out relevant and material testimony. Moreover, the
judge instructed the jury that any intimation in his questions
or the questions of counsel that certain facts were or were not
true must be disregarded, and he adequately instructed thcm
that they were the exclusive judges of the effect and value of
the evidence.
.
Defendant also contends that the court erred in curtailing
the voir dire examination of the jurors, The court conducted an elaborate voir dire examination and then allowed
each party to examine the prospective jurors, Defense couusel
attempted to ask the jurors the branch of military service
with which they had been affiliated, whether the juror would
be prejudiced by reason of the fact that there was a "divorce
in this case," and whether any of the jurors were related to
a law enforcement officer.
The court refused to permit these questions on the ground
that they were asked to obtain information for peremptory
challenges. [ 13 ] "It is now well settled in this state that
a juror may not be examined on voir dire solely for the
purpose of laying the foundation for the exercise of a peremptory challenge." (People v. Ferl1'n, 203 Cal. 587, 598 [265
P. 230].) [ 14] If special circumstances in the present case
made defendant's questions relevant to show bias or other
grounds for a challenge for cause he should have informed
the court of his reasons for asking the questions, (People v.
Hinshaw,40 Cal.App. 672, 674 [182 p, 59].)
[15] Defendant contends that the court erroneously ruled
out of order a question designed to establish that after defendant's first visit Brown stated: "[i]f Rigs comes back

!
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I'll tear him apart." It is conceded that defendant did
not hear this threat. At the time the question was asked
there was no evidence ill the record that Brown may have
been the aggressor or that defendant was aeting ill self-defense.
Evidenee of an uncollullunicateu threat is proper only after
a foundation has bcen laid tending to show that the victim
was the aggl'cssor. (People v. Spraic, 87 Cal.App. 724, 729-730
[262 P. 795] ; see 1 Wigmore, Evidence [3d ed.] 552.) The
question was not reaskedafter such foundation had been laid.
[16] Defendant contends that the court erred in ruling
out of order a question designed to elicit Brown's tone of
voice when he statcd that he was coming out to see defendant.
After the question was asked the court stated that Brown's
tone of voice was irrelevant, but the answer to the question,
that Brown's tone was" harsh," was not struck and remained
in the record for the jury's consideration.
[17] Defendant objects to the court's instruction that
after an interlocutory divorce" [neither spouse] without consent of the other may legally iuvade the other's separate home,
nor eject a guest thercfrom, nor exercise any dominion over
it. The fact that olle of the spouses is given the right of
visitation with a child in thc custody of the other does not
affect the rule just stated."
The correctness of the instruction is not disputed. Defendantinsists, however, that in view of the refusal to instruct that defendant had a right to visit his child, the instruction may have misled the jury into believing that defendant's
conduct in approaching llis ,,,,ife's apartment was unlawful
as a matter of law.
There was evidence that defendant contemplated the use
of force to visit his child. The court, therefore, properly
instructed the jury that defendant did 110t have the right to
use force. Defendant's proposed instruction stated that defendant had a right to visit his child, but failed to state that
he could not use force to do so, and was therefore properly
refused.
[18] After deliberating for some time, the jury requested
further instructions on intent and transfer of intent. The
court repeated the instructions on transferred intent and
gave examples illustrating the application of the rules, In
the examples the court used itself and members of the jury
as parties, The fOt'eman th(>n imlicah'll that he Ullllerstooll
the instructions uut that he was not certain how to apply
them to the prescnt l'nse. The court replicd that the ap-
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plication of the law to the facts was the province of the jury.
There is no merit in defendant's contention that the court
erred in using examples in which members of the jury were
parties and in referring to the foreman as "My frknd. " Dc·
fendant also contends that the court erred in repeating the
instructions on transferred intent only and failing to repeat
the instructions on intent, on the ground that this failure may
have been interpreted by the jury as a mandate to find intent
and transfer it. This contention is without merit. The
court's earlier instructions fully and adequately instructed
the jury on the law of intent and the foreman indicated that
the repeated instructions answered the question asked by
the jury. The court's duty is fully performed if the addi·
tional instructions answer the question of the jury. (People
v. Finali, 31 Cal.App. 479, 489 [160 P. 850] ; ct. Olson v.
Standard Marine Ins. Co., 109 Cal.App.2d 130, 140-141 [240
P.2d 379].)
[19] The court instructed the jury to return to court
when it had arrived at a verdict on any of the three counts.
The jury first returned a verdict finding defendant guilty
of assault against Mrs. Rigney and Sharon Brown. The
jury then returned to the jury room and found defendant
guilty of assault with intent to kill Brown. Defendant
did not object to this procedure when the court first suggested it. In his motion for a new trial and on appeal he
contends that under Penal Code, section 1164, the jury must
be discharged after any verdict has been announced. Section
1164 provides:
"When the verdict given is such as the court may receive,
the clerk, or if there is no clerk, the judge or justice, must
record it in full upon the minutes, and if requested by any
party must read it to the jury, and inquire of them whether
it is their verdict. If any juror disagrees, the fact must be
entered upon the minutes and the jury again sent out; but
if no disagreement is expressed, the verdict is complete, and
the jury must be discharged from the case."
This section does not preclude the jury's making a separate
return of its verdict on each count when more than one count
is charged. Penal Code, section 954, expressly vests in the
court the power to have separate courtts tried separately.
There is no reason why the court should not have the jury's
verdicts on each count returnt'd separately. Such procedure
is followed in the federal courts. (See United States v. Cotter,
60 F.2d 689, 690·691.) In New York, which has a statute
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identical with Penal COile. s(,ction 1164 (New York Code
of Criminal Pl'ol'ellure, § 451), verdicts lllay be reLurned
separately ,,,hen lllore than one defendant is 011 tt·ial. (People
v. Cohen, 223 N.Y. 406 [lU) N.E. 886, 893-894].)
The judgment and the order denying a new trial are
affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., McComb, J., White, J., and Dooling, J.,
concurred.
Schaner, J., concurred in the judgment.
PETERS, J.-I dissent. In my opinion the record in this
case demonstrates that the trial judge aligned himself with
the prosecution by assumillg the role of prosecutor, and clearly
indicated to the jury his disbelief in the main defense of the
defendant. The two witnesses were constantly interrupted
by the trial judge, who then exhanstively, argumentatively
and repetitiously examined them almost to the complete exclusion of the district attorney. Such examination was officious and unnecessary. It necessarily deprived the defendant
of that fair and impartial trial guaranteed to him by the
Constitution of this state and of the United States.
The majority opinion correctly and fairly states the facts.
It also sets forth the general principles applicable to the
examination of witnesses by the trial judge, and briefly
mentions the limitations on that power. The majority opinion
correctly points out that while a trial judge, in a criminal
case, has the power and duty to elicit and to elarify the testimony he "must not become an advocate for either party or
under the guise of examining witnesses comment on the evidence or cast aspersions or ridicule on a witness." It is also
pointed out that comment on the evidence in the guise of
questions should not be indulged in during trial, and that
the trial judge may not, properly, ask questions casting
aspersions on the eredibility of any witness. It is also the
law that the trial judge should not, by his questions, distort
the testimony nor engage in partisan advocacy.
In my opinion the record demonstrates that all of these
rules were violated. The record shows that defendant's defense was that he acted in self-defense up to a point, and
that he then suffered a loss of memory. After the defendant
testified as to the claimed loss of memory, and while the
prosecutor was cross-examining, the judge simply took over
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that cross-examination. His questions covered the pertinent
periods time and time again, and embraced much of the material already brought out by thc prosecution. After the
prosecutor had concluded his examination, the judge took
over again, and again covered the same field that he had
already covered at great length. After the defendant had
been removed from the stand the judge recalled him and again
subjected him to a grueling cross-examination. All objections by defense counsel to these tactics were overruled. The
questions were partisan, repetitive and argumentative, and
some of them ridiculed the witness.
So far as the conference in chambers is concerned, at which
defendant and his counsel were, of course, present, the sole
question involved was whether Doctor Brandmeyer could give
his opinion as to whether defendant was suffering from retrograde amnesia. After properly ruling that the doctor could
testify on the subject, the trial judge then took 38 pages of
the transcript to lecture the defendant and his counsel on how
ridiculous he thought this defense was. Whether intended as
such or not, such tactics could not fail to intimidate the
defendant and his counsel.
After this colloquy in chambers Doctor Brandmeyer was
called to the stand. The doctor, who was a reputable navy
psychiatrist, was defendant's chief witness. The court was
sarcastic and unfair to this witness. Even during his direct
examination the trial judge took over and asked questions
permissible only as cross-examination. If the prosecutor had
thus interrupted defense counsel it would have been error,
and it was equally wrong for the trial judge to have used such
tactics. The record shows that the judge simply took over the
cross-examination of this key witness. When the defense took
the doctor on redirect to try to repair the damage caused by
the judge's questions, as soon as the doctor gave an opinion
favorable to the defense, the judge broke in and cross-examined
in a fashion so as to ridicule that opinion.
.
Undoubtedly the trial judge tried to be fair, and undoubtedly his motives were of the best, but his examination of these
witnesses was such that it ridiculed the defendant's defense,
and obviously was aimed at inducing the jury to disbelieve
that testimony. This was prejudicial. These errors clearly
denied defendant the fair trial to which he was entitled. I
would reverse the judgment.

